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ABSTRACT 
This briefing explores options for monitoring and enforcement of European Union (EU) 
human rights due diligence legislation, and how such legislation should contribute to 
access to justice and remedy for victims of human rights abuses linked to the 
operations of businesses inside or operating from Member States (MS). The briefing 
reviews existing due diligence and disclosure schemes and considers the feasibility of 
specific options for monitoring, enforcement and access to remedy within a future EU 
due diligence law. The briefing recommends that such legislation should require 
effective monitoring via company-level obligations, national and EU-level measures, 
including repositories of due diligence reports, lists of companies required to report, 
information request procedures, monitoring bodies and delegated legislation or 
guidance further elaborating on due diligence under the law. Regarding enforcement, 
the law should inter alia require MS to determine appropriate penalties for non-
compliance and to establish enforcement rights for interested parties. Finally, on 
remedy, the law should, besides requiring companies to establish complaint 
mechanisms, provide for national and EU measures, including requirements that MS 
ensure effective means of remedy and redress for victims and establish or identify 
bodies to investigate abuses, initiate enforcement and support victims. 
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1 Introduction 
This briefing considers how EU legislation on corporate human rights due diligence should be monitored 
and enforced, and how such legislation should facilitate access to justice and remedy for victims of 
business-related human rights abuses. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
(UN, 2011) call for all businesses to undertake due diligence to operationalise their responsibility to respect 
human rights. Based on States’ obligations under human rights treaties, the UNGPs prescribe that states 
should adopt a ‘smart mix’ of legislative and other regulatory measures ‘to prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress’ business-related human rights abuses (UNGP No 1 ). The EU and EU Member States (MS) have 
affirmed their commitment to uphold the UNGPs through numerous policy instruments (e.g. European 
Commission (EC), 2011; EC, 2015; EP, 2016). Some MS have enacted laws requiring businesses to perform 
human rights due diligence, including France’s Loi de Vigilance (LDV) and the Netherlands’ Child Labour 
Due Diligence Law. Other MS are considering adopting such legislation. At the same time, company 
implementation of due diligence across the EU remains at best uneven (CHRB, 2019; ACT, 2020; EC, 2020), 
while business-related abuses are not diminishing at home or abroad (FRA, 2019; International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), 2019; BHRRC, n.d.) and rather continue to manifest on new fronts (RDR, 2019; EP, 2017a, 
2019a; COE, n.d.). As observed by the European Parliament (EP) (EP, 2016, 2017b), this suggests a role for 
EU due diligence legislation, to honour EU human rights obligations and commitments, to secure a ‘level 
playing field’ across the EU single market and to advance the accountability of governments and 
businesses. Furthermore, such legislation should support access to remedy for victims and help protect 
human rights defenders whilst also supporting the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) (WBCSD, 2017; ILO, 2019b).   
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
This briefing aims to support the EP in developing its position on EU human rights due diligence legislation. 
It considers options for the monitoring and enforcement of such legislation, and how it should contribute 
to strengthening access to justice and remedy for victims of human rights abuses linked to businesses 
operating within or from MS. It assumes that EU human rights due diligence legislation would be horizontal 
(cross-sectoral), address a broad spectrum of human and labour rights (all internationally-recognised 
human rights) and cover business-related abuses inside the EU and in non-EU countries by EU-based 
companies, whether directly through their presence or investments, or indirectly through supply chain or 
established commercial relations1.  
Under the UNGPs, monitoring is an essential dimension of due diligence for individual companies. 
Outcomes revealed by company monitoring should drive remediation efforts as well as continual 
improvement in company policies and practice (UNGP 20). At the same time, in the context of EU due 
diligence legislation, monitoring should refer to steps taken by other parties, at national or EU level, to 
track companies’ compliance with due diligence obligations or the overall effectiveness of a legislative 
scheme in preventing or addressing corporate abuses. Enforcement, whether by MS, EU-level authorities, 
or at private initiative, secures the fulfilment of legal responsibilities. In the due diligence context, 
enforcement should seek to fulfil companies’ procedural or substantive obligations. It might operate via 
complaints procedures, civil litigation, or criminal prosecution of individuals or corporations, and should 
result in the imposition of pecuniary or other penalties. Access to justice and remedy refers to judicial, 
administrative or other mechanisms to ensure that when business-related human rights abuses occur, 
those affected can avail themselves of an effective remedy (UNGP No 25). 
 
1 In line with the TOR, it is not assumed for the purpose of this analysis that EU due diligence legislation would extend beyond 
human rights to environmental and governance risks and impacts. 
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Parts 2, 3 and 4 of this briefing address monitoring, enforcement and remedy respectively. Each Part 
identifies and evaluates elements that could feature in an EU corporate human rights due diligence law, 
on the basis of a review of existing disclosure-based regimes and corporate human rights due 
diligence laws. Part 5 makes recommendations for measures that could be included in such a law and 
addressed to the EU, MS and other actors. 
1.2 Methodology 
This briefing draws on a desk review of selected legislation; soft laws and policies; judicial decisions; 
institutional studies; civil society, scholarly and other relevant material (see Bibliography). Annex I 
summarises, in table form, an evaluation of possible measures that could be included in EU due diligence 
legislation in relation to monitoring. Annex II presents the same analysis in relation to enforcement 
measures, and Annex III lays this analysis with regard to remedies. Annexes IV and V respectively review 
provisions on monitoring and enforcement of selected due diligence and disclosure schemes. 
2 Monitoring 
Monitoring is intrinsic to the process of human rights due diligence, as the UNGPs and other relevant 
guidance (e.g. EC, 2017; OECD, 2018) make clear. Where disclosure obligations address due diligence 
processes, these logically entail that companies will undertake monitoring, albeit this may not be explicitly 
stated. Companies need to monitor actual and potential impacts of activities across their own operations, 
business relationships and partners, and the effectiveness of their due diligence arrangements in 
preventing and redressing harm. Yet external monitoring of human rights due diligence is also essential. 
Even if human rights reporting practices can trigger positive changes at company level (e.g. McPhail and 
Adams, 2016; Ethical Trading Initiative and Hult International Business School, 2016; McCorquodale et al, 
2017), non-financial reports remain an unreliable guide to companies’ sustainability risks, impacts and 
performance (e.g. Parsa et al, 2018; Doan and Sassen, 2020). Furthermore, disclosure obligations, in 
isolation, are a weak driver of effective due diligence and remediation (Methven O’Brien and Dhanarajan, 
2016; LeBaron and Rühmkorf, 2017; United Kingdom (UK) Government, 2019; CHRB, 2019; ACT, 2020). 
Companies’ internal monitoring processes should, then, involve third parties and be supplemented by 
external monitoring by governmental and third party mechanisms (EC, 2017). 
2.1 Monitoring: review of current approaches 
Company-level due diligence monitoring: Most legislative schemes (see Annex IV refer to or entail the 
need for companies to undertake monitoring as part of the due diligence process (EU Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive (NFR); California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA); UK Modern Slavery Act 
(UK MSA); Australia Federal MSA (AusMSA); Dodd Frank Act Final Rule 1502; French Law on Duty of 
Vigilance (LDV); Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act; EU Conflict Mineral Regulation). The LDV makes 
explicit that each company must establish a monitoring scheme (« Un dispositif de suivi des mesures mises 
en œuvre et d'évaluation de leur efficacité ») as one of five specified ‘reasonable vigilance measures’ (“les 
mesures de vigilance raisonnable”). In most cases, monitoring is periodic: few schemes establish one-off 
disclosure requirements (CTSCA; Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act).  
Non-compliance with company-level monitoring duties does not attract penalties under some schemes 
(UK MSA). Others are more clearly mandatory (LDV; EU Timber; EU Conflict Minerals). Monitoring 
requirements generally follow the purpose and scope of obligations under the scheme in question. Thus, 
where the due diligence duty covers business partners, companies’ monitoring duties follow accordingly 
(e.g. monitoring under the LDV covers subsidiaries and subcontractors/suppliers linked by an ‘established 
commercial relationship’; under the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act it should cover the entire supply 
chain). Non-financial statements under the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive (EU NFR) Directive should 
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cover ‘business relationships, products or services which are likely to cause adverse impacts… and how 
the undertaking manages those risks’, where ‘relevant and proportionate’ (Art 19a). Some schemes 
mandate that disclosures cover grievance or early warning mechanisms, implying that monitoring 
arrangements at company level should integrate these elements (EU Conflict Minerals; LDV). Others 
mandate board approval of the company’s monitoring scheme and/or reports based thereon (UK MSA; Aus 
MSA), or internal training for the board and company staff (NSW MSA), in line with international guidance 
on effective human rights due diligence (e.g. UNGPs; OECD, 2018). 
Government monitoring: Legislation may seek to involve government bodies in due diligence 
monitoring, for instance, by requiring companies to file due diligence reports (Dutch Child Labour Due 
Diligence Act; NSW MSA), in some cases for subsequent publication (US Dodd Frank; CTSCA; Aus MSA). 
Certain laws and proposals go further, imposing on national authorities the obligation to monitor 
individual companies’ fulfilment of due diligence or disclosure obligations (EU Conflict Minerals; Dutch 
Child Labour Due Diligence Law; Norway Ethics Information Committee, 2019). Independent bodies may 
be tasked to review the legislation’s overall application and effectiveness (UK MSA; NSW MSA). EU 
legislation may require MS to appoint competent national oversight authorities (EU Timber), to identify 
and publish lists of companies subject to due diligence requirements and to undertake checks on company 
compliance (EU Conflict Minerals). Legislation may also provide for time-bound review of its effectiveness 
(EU Conflict Minerals; Aus MSA). 
Third party monitoring: Theoretically, disclosure obligations ought to permit monitoring and evaluation 
of individual companies’ due diligence processes, and their effectiveness, by third parties, such as NGOs, 
investors and business partners. Associated reputational risk could encourage companies to implement 
and report on due diligence, even where disclosure obligations are imposed on a ‘soft’, or ‘comply or 
explain’ basis. Yet disclosure regimes have not in themselves been effective drivers of due diligence 
(Methven O’Brien and Dhanarajan, 2016; CHRB, 2019; Doan and Sassen, 2020; EC, 2020). Even rates of 
compliance with formal reporting obligations under MSA, CTSCA and EU NFR are lower than 30 % (NYU 
Stern, 2019; ACT, 2018). 
This explains the growing interest in mandatory due diligence legislation (LDV; Dutch Child Labour Due 
Diligence Law) and the spread of initiatives ranking human rights performance of businesses. Some of the 
latter are horizontal while others target specific sectors (CHRB, 2019; BHRRC, 2018; Ergon, 2018; Terre 
Solidaire 2019; Know the Chain, 2019a, b and c). Where legislation has failed to establish national 
repositories of due diligence reports (UK MSA; LDV) civil society initiatives have sought to fill this gap by 
collecting and publishing such reports2.  
Complaint mechanisms have both monitoring and remedial functions. They are recommended or required 
by various schemes which may distinguish early alert or warning mechanisms (LDV) from complaints based 
on substantiated concerns (EU Timber). The role of third parties in monitoring has been sharpened under 
later schemes via associated enforcement mechanisms (LDV; Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law; see 
further Section 3 below). Draft legislation on transparency in Norway goes further. This would support 
monitoring by establishing a right to information on ‘how an enterprise conducts itself with regard to 
fundamental rights and decent work within the enterprise and its supply chains’, along with an information 
request procedure, applicable to all businesses, not just to large companies subject to formal reporting 
requirements (Norway Ethics Information Committee, 2019). 
Some regimes require that supply chain audits are undertaken byindependent auditors and thus envisage 
a role for third parties (CTSCA; EU Conflict Minerals; under the EU Timber Regulation, those private entities 
 
2 E.g. the Modern Slavery Registry gathers modern slavery statements under the UK MSA, AU Fed MSA and CTSCA  
(https://www.modernslaveryregistry.org/); the Duty of Vigilance Radar likewise collates vigilance plans under the LDV 
(https://vigilance-plan.org/). The NSW MSA establishes an electronic public register. 
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must be recognised as such by the EU). In practice, third party audit is widely relied on by companies to 
support monitoring and reporting independently of such laws. Yet the weaknesses of professional audit 
(often referred to as social audit) in identifying risks and securing remediation are well documented (ILO, 
2016; Outhwaite and Martin-Ortega, 2019), leading many NGOs to advocate worker-driven supply chain 
monitoring instead (Worker Rights Consortium, n.d.; Electronics Watch, n.d.; Worker Driven Social 
Responsibility Network, n.d.).  
2.2 Monitoring: evaluating possible mechanisms 
Monitoring provisions of an EU due diligence law will be influenced by the legislation’s scope and approach 
in other areas as well as wider EU legal and policy frameworks. For example, if only larger companies are 
addressed by a due diligence duty, it should be considered how that class of companies relates to the class 
of companies addressed by existing (or revised) EU NFR legislation. It would make little sense to oblige 
companies to report on due diligence (via NFR) but not to monitor its impact under a new due diligence 
law. On the other hand, the value of a legal due diligence obligation without a corresponding ‘hard’ 
reporting obligation can be questioned — as can the value of reporting as an aid to monitoring, where this 
is not undertaken periodically on a standardised basis and in accordance with adequate reporting formats. 
While investors’ potential monitoring role may be advanced by the recent EU Regulation on sustainability-
related disclosures in the financial services sector (EU SRD), it would seem reasonable to expect financial 
services providers themselves to be included within the scope of EU due diligence law. The same is true for 
large public entities, given the need for a level-playing field in the context of procurement, and for 
government to ‘lead by example’.  
Full consideration of such interdependencies exceeds the scope of the present briefing. It can be said, 
though, that periodic monitoring should be part of the due diligence process required of companies under 
any future EU due diligence law. To promote the effectiveness and accountability of their monitoring 
schemes, companies should be required to ensure adequate worker, stakeholder and board-level 
involvement in their design and implementation, and to establish early warning and/or complaint 
mechanisms. Such measures appear feasible, at least for large companies, mirroring requirements of 
existing schemes; their details could be addressed through delegated legislation or formal guidance. An 
information request procedure would further strengthen transparency and accountability.  
In terms of monitoring by MS or an EU body, this might relate to formal due diligence requirements, such 
as the publication of due diligence plans. More impactful would be monitoring which would seek to 
evaluate effectiveness of due diligence efforts through verification measures such as checks, qualitative 
and thematic analyses. MS repositories and publication of lists of companies subject to and meeting (or 
not) the due diligence duty would also appear valuable and feasible. Repositories and lists could enhance 
EU level evaluation, and thus convergence, particularly if supplemented by an EU-wide repository and e.g. 
regional sector analyses. Costs of the latter might be modest, given the scope to base these on data already 
collected at MS-level. However, costs associated with establishing and maintaining either MS or EU level 
monitoring bodies could challenge their feasibility where monitoring duties are more expansive or where 
independent entities are envisaged. An EU-level recognition procedure for auditing organisations might 
allow for quality assurance of company-level monitoring processes, but in the context of broad-spectrum 
human rights due diligence going beyond compliance with technical matters such as chain of custody 
requirements raises issues requiring further reflection. 
In summary, the present analysis suggests that company-level monitoring should be specified as an 
element of the corporate duty of due diligence under EU law. This should be supplemented by monitoring 
by executive authorities and/or independent bodies at MS and EU level and statutory review. Third-party 
monitoring should be supported by additional mechanisms including complaint mechanisms, public 
registers and a right to know/information request procedure. All such measures appear feasible at least for 
large companies. 
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3 Enforcement 
Monitoring mechanisms promote fulfilment of due diligence duties indirectly. Enforcement mechanisms, 
by distinction, should trigger compliance with procedural or substantive duties, or both, in specific cases3. 
Enforcement provisions vary across existing regimes. Yet the persistence of weak compliance with both 
disclosure requirements (NYU Stern, 2019; ACT, 2020; Parsa et al, 2018; Doan and Sassen, 2020) and due 
diligence obligations (Methven O’Brien and Dhanarajan, 2016; CHRB, 2019) points to the inadequacy of 
existing enforcement mechanisms. 
3.1 Enforcement: review of current approaches 
Where powers to initiate enforcement action rest exclusively with executive authorities, their use tends to 
remain theoretical or marginal (UK MSA; NSW MSA; CTSCA). Under the UK MSA companies can in principle 
be compelled to publish statements via injunction on the application of the Secretary of State. Yet this 
mechanism has never been used (UK Government, 2019). Approaches allowing for enforcement at the 
motion of third parties appear more promising. Under the LDV any interested party can seek a formal 
notice to comply if a company fails to establish, implement or publish a vigilance plan. If there is no 
response from the company within a 3-month period, the company may, on the application of a party with 
standing under French law, be required by a judge to comply, subject to a penalty, by establishing the 
vigilance plan, ensuring its publication and accounting for its effective implementation or to give an 
account of the absence of a plan. These provisions have already been relied on by civil society on several 
occasions (Bright, 2018; Cossart and Chatelain, 2019; Renaud et al, 2019) albeit their ultimate impact is as 
yet unclear (Conseil Général de l’Économie de l’Industrie, de l’Énergie et des Technologies, 2020; Brabant 
and Savourey, 2020; Savourey 2020; Claude and Amati, 2020). 
Under the Dutch Child Labour Law, failures to comply with requirements to conduct investigations or 
submit statements may result in administrative orders and fines, at the motion of the supervisory authority 
identified by the law. If initial fines are set at a “symbolic” level, they may be raised for repeated defaults 
(MVOPlatform, 2019). Besides, under the Dutch Law, any natural person or legal entity whose interests are 
affected by the actions or omissions of a company (relating to compliance) may submit a complaint to the 
supervisory authority, after having first attempted to resolve the complaint directly with the company, or 
six months after the submission of the complaint to the company without it having been addressed. 
Norway’s draft law on transparency envisages penalties for contravention inter alia of right to information 
requests and, for large enterprises, the annual due diligence reporting duty (Norway Ethics Information 
Committee, 2019). The NSW MSA provides for administrative sanctions on companies for giving false or 
misleading information and for failing to prepare or publish an annual modern slavery report.  
EU instruments require MS to determine the consequences of non-compliance (NFR) or appropriate 
penalties (EU Timber; EU Conflict Minerals regulation does not require MS to establish penalties but 
foresees this possibility after revision of the Regulation from 2023). The EU Timber regulation requires that 
such penalties as established by MS are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ (Art 19), and has included 
indicative lists of penalties such as fines and suspension of authorisation to trade.  
The Dutch Child Labour Law envisages criminal liability in certain cases. Beyond initial fines for failure to 
submit a due diligence statement, a company director may face a prison sentence when the company has 
been fined twice within a five year period for not conducting due diligence in line with the legislation. The 
company may, in this situation, be fined up to EUR 750 000 or 10 % of annual turnover. Under the UK MSA, 
 
3 Though technically enforcement action could also refer to performance by MS of their obligations under EU due diligence 
legislation, this is not considered further here; neither are the various issues raised by possible EU accession to the ECHR.  
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failure to comply with an injunction requiring production of an annual slavery and human trafficking 
statement would be a contempt of court, punishable by a fine through a civil procedure. The French 
Conseil Constitutionnel declared unconstitutional provisions of the draft LDV which had sought to 
establish criminal sanctions (in the form of civil fines, ‘amende civile’) for failures to  develop, publish or 
effectively implement a human rights due diligence plan on the basis of the principle of legality 4. Finally, 
some regimes require government entities (United States of America (US) FAR; Aus MSA) or companies (EU 
Conflict Minerals) to cascade due diligence requirements to business partners via contract clauses.  
3.2 Enforcement: evaluating possible mechanisms 
Effective enforcement is essential to promote homogeneous application of due diligence nationally 
(Conseil Général de l’Économie de l’Industrie, de l’Énergie et des Technologies, 2020) but also, through 
coordination and information sharing, to building common enforcement practice and a level playing field 
across the EU (Client Earth and Global Witness, 2019). The attribution to MS bodies of the power to initiate 
enforcement proceedings and impose administrative sanctions in individual cases would be ideal. Still, 
such activities have resource implications even if undertaken, following appropriate amendments to legal 
mandates, by existing bodies (e.g. NHRI; FRA). Accordingly, EU legislation should also harness the potential 
of third-party enforcement action, via rights of complaint for interested parties for breaches of procedural 
due diligence requirements. Enforcing qualitative due diligence standards would be more resource 
intensive for third parties as well as administrative or judicial bodies and defendant companies and may 
for this reason be considered less feasible. 
Affording discretion to MS to determine sanctions for non-compliance (subject to the overall requirements 
of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness) has the virtue of flexibility. Based on experiences 
under e.g. the EU Timber Regulation, however, a prescriptive approach may be more likely to secure the 
EU ‘level playing field’ desired by business and governments (EC, 2020). Yet, scope for an EU due diligence 
law to define criminal sanctions appears limited given the EU’s restricted competences in this area (Art 4 
TFEU).  
As for monitoring (Section 2), enforcement measures under an EU due diligence law will be influenced by 
the scope of corporate obligations established and the class or classes of companies to which due diligence 
obligations apply, as well as the general division of competences between EU and MS. Leaving such 
matters aside, based on the evidence considered here, an effective EU human rights due diligence law 
should combine state-based and third-party enforcement mechanisms. These should relate at least to 
procedural due diligence requirements such as the adoption and publication of a due diligence plan (and 
by implication performance of a due diligence process) as well as failure to comply with an information 
request. A law should also promote consistent standards and approaches to enforcement across the EU,by 
defining required elements in legislation or guidance, and via periodic reporting by MS on enforcement 
action. Finally, in line with the ‘smart mix’ (Methven O’Brien, 2019b) and in light of the US FAR, further 
consideration should be given to leveraging EU public procurement law to promote compliance with due 
diligence obligations (Methven O’Brien, Martin-Ortega and Conlon, 2018; Martin-Ortega and Methven 
O’Brien, 2019) and how to align ‘development, governance and diplomatic initiatives’ by MS and the EU 
(EC, 2015) with new EU due diligence legislation. 
 
4 Décision no 2017-750 DC du 23 Mars 2017 du Conseil Constitutionnel ; see further Cossart, Chaplier and Beau de Lomenie (2017). 
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4 Access to justice and remedies for victims 
4.1 Remedy  
Human rights standards establish a right to effective remedy with substantive and procedural dimensions5. 
What constitutes an effective remedy is context-dependent and may range from prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators in case of serious abuses, to compensation for economically assessable 
damage, orders for restitution of victims, changes in company policies, guarantees of non-repetition or 
disciplinary action against responsible personnel and public apologies 6. 
Accordingly, the UNGPs provide that ‘States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy’ (UNGP No25). This formulation 
highlights that in general current human rights law does not formally oblige states to guarantee the right 
to remedy ‘extraterritorially’ (Methven O’Brien, 2019b). Equally, not all kinds of harm to individuals resulting 
from business activities entail human rights violations (e.g. if adequate remediation is available through 
existing mechanisms at national level or where interference with rights is insufficient to trigger third party 
effects).  
Nonetheless, MS, EU and other regional institutions have repeatedly undertaken to uphold effective access 
for justice and remediation of business-related human rights abuses, inside and outside their territory or 
technical legal jurisdiction, via both legal and policy commitments (EC, 2020; ECCJ, 2020; COE, 2016). 
Securing effective remedy would also support realisation of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable 
Development Goals (ILO, 2019b).  
Yet victims continue to face legal and practical obstacles to access to justice and effective remedy. These 
include limits on parent company liability (the ‘corporate veil’), inequality of arms, access to legal 
representation, information and evidence, attacks on human rights defenders, victims, witnesses, lawyers, 
judges and journalists, the risk of counter-litigation, including Strategic Lawsuits against public 
participation actions (SLAPP suits) as well as the limits of representative and collective redress mechanisms 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2016; EU FRA, 2017, 2019; EC, 2019; Rubio and Yiannibas, 2017; Bonfanti, 2019). 
Since 2011, such issues have been only weakly addressed by relevant laws, at EU and MS level, or policy 
initiatives such as National Action Plans to implement the UNGPs (DIHR, n.d.; ICAR and ECCJ, 2017b). 
4.2 Remedy: review of current approaches  
Disclosure regimes can support the substantive dimension of remediation, for instance, where reporting 
requirements encourage the establishment of internal complaints mechanisms (Aus MSA, Norway 
proposal). However, disclosure regimes are generally more relevant to the procedural aspects of remedy. 
Under CTSCA and UK MSA, government officers can enforce company reporting obligations; under NSW 
MSA fines can be imposed for non-compliance with procedural requirements. Information yielded by the 
operation of such mechanisms can in principle support victims in obtaining remedies. Yet such provisions 
 
5 See Methven O’Brien (2019a) for further discussion in relation to the right to remedy under ECHR and ESC. 
6 Article 8 UDHR, Art 2(3) ICCPR, Art 6 CERD, Art 14 CAT, Art 39 CRC. ICESCR and CEDAW do not explicitly provide for a right to 
remedy. Article 13 ECHR establishes the right to remedy for violations of Convention rights: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms 
as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’. Article 47 ECFR establishes the right to remedy for violations 
of rights guaranteed by EU law. See further UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2005). 
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are rarely used in practice (see Section 3) and overall disclosure regimes’ impact on remediation is both 
indirect and weak. 
Enhancing remedies for victims was one goal of the French LDV.  The LDV establishes a right of civil action 
for victims of tortious damage caused by failures of due diligence by a parent company, its subsidiaries, 
suppliers or subcontractors with an established commercial relationship7. In addition, as discussed earlier, 
the LDV further permits interested parties to seek a formal notice and injunction to comply with its due 
diligence requirements. This also supports remediation as such measures may be probative of a lack of 
vigilance during a subsequent civil claim 8. Further, the LDV allows a court to order publication, 
dissemination or display of its decision with costs to be paid by the defendant.  
The Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act does not establish any new basis for claims by victims in tort. 
Rather it permits complaints by any natural person or legal entity affected by a company’s actions or 
omissions (Art 3), along with administrative fines and, in limited circumstances, criminal convictions for 
repeated failures to comply with due diligence obligations (see Section 3).  
In the UK, courts have established that a duty of care may be owed by the parent company not only to a 
subsidiary’s employees, but also to other persons affected by its operations9. Yet, in general, parent 
company liability for human rights abuses remains restricted (EP, 2019b; FRA, 2019a). Neither do existing 
schemes shift the burden of proof, a recognised challenge for victims in civil litigation addressing business-
related human rights harms (ECCJ, 2018; EP, 2019b; EC, 2020). However, some proposed laws would require 
a defendant company in civil proceedings to prove that it met its due diligence obligation (e.g. Swiss 
Coalition for Corporate Justice, n.d.) or that it lacked effective control over a subsidiary (Swiss Parliament, 
2018) once a prima facie case has been made.  
Turning to EU level, the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation requires companies to establish a grievance 
mechanism (Art 4(e)), which means an early-warning risk awareness mechanism allowing any interested 
party, including whistle-blowers, to voice concerns regarding the circumstances of extraction, trade and 
handling of minerals in and export of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Besides, proposals 
have been advanced to revise the Brussels I Recast Regulation (EP, 2019). Firstly, it has been suggested that 
a new jurisdictional rule specific to business-related human rights claims should extend jurisdiction to MS 
courts where an EU parent company is domiciled to claims against its foreign subsidiaries or business 
partners permitting claims against the parent company and the subsidiary to be heard together. A second 
proposal would establish  forum necessitatis for MS courts where the right to a fair trial or access to justice 
so requires and the dispute has sufficient connection with the MS in question (EP, 2019b). 
Anti-corruption laws may impose strict liability for compliance failures, subject to a defence based on 
‘adequate procedures’10. Some proposals have suggested the adoption of similar approaches in the 
context of corporate human rights harms (e.g. Pietropaoli et al, 2019). Their viability in the context of an EU 
human rights due diligence law seems questionable, given inter alia requirements for legal predictability, 
a lack of precedents at national or EU level and the principle of subsidiarity (Art 5(3) TEU). 
4.3 Remedies: evaluating possible mechanisms 
Effective remediation remains out of reach for most victims, inside and beyond EU borders, and even for 
victims of the most serious abuses, including human trafficking and modern slavery, violations of ILO Core 
 
7 A claimant must still prove the elements of liability while the obligation on companies remains procedural, and not one of result. 
8 It has also been said that the LDV promotes remediation indirectly by helping victims to overcome hurdles to access to justice 
because ‘it requires companies to identify risks of severe impacts. This makes it easier for victims to argue that a company could 
have influenced the production of harmful impacts, and that it should have taken appropriate measures to prevent them’ (ECCJ, 
2017a). 
9 Vedanta Resources PLC and another v Lungowe and others, UKSC 2017/0185, [2019] UKSC 20, Judgment, 10 Apr 2019.  
10 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC §§ 78dd-1 et seq, UK Bribery Act 2010, s23. 
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Labour Standards and serious environmental incidents harming human health (FRA, 2018; OECD Watch, 
2015; EP, 2019b; EC, 2019; EC, 2020). At the same time, abuses may have complex root causes: identifying 
what would be an effective remedy may be straightforward, but in global value chain settings effective 
remediation may also demand long-term multi-actor solutions (Bangladesh Accord, n.d.; ILO, n.d.; IOE, 
2018). In addition, remediation of certain types of abuse (e.g. human trafficking) is already addressed via 
specific legislative and policy schemes at MS or regional level (Lietonen Jokinen and Pekkarinen 2020).  
Nevertheless, in line with obligations under human rights treaties and the UNGPs, an EU due diligence law 
should aim to contribute to advancing effective remediation for victims. As already highlighted in Section 
2, EU due diligence legislation should therefore require company grievance mechanisms as part of human 
rights due diligence procedures (UNGPs; OECD, 2019). These are relatively low-cost, while also potentially 
expeditious and effective for victims. Still, concerns remain, including independence, inequality of arms, 
lack of access to information and evidence for victims, and a weak deterrence effect, especially where they 
operate subject to non-disclosure clauses. In isolation, such mechanisms are inadequate to guarantee 
redress for victims.  
Administrative sanctions linked to procedural due diligence obligations contribute to certain aspects of 
remediation. Like internal grievance mechanisms, they should be expeditious, cheaper and more 
accessible than judicial proceedings. They also appear feasible at MS level. Yet civil liability for the 
consequences of due diligence failures, at least in relation to abuses that are severe based on their 
seriousness or extent, is potentially more impactful. The award against companies of significant money 
damages ought to have a deterrent effect, both on an individual defendant and more widely. On the other 
hand, civil litigation is slow, expensive, assumes the availability of adequate legal representation and can 
be burdensome for victims, despite appropriate arrangements for representative or collective claims (FRA, 
2019a, 2019b; EC, 2019; UN, 2016; Claude and Amati, 2020). Even if a due diligence law established a duty 
of care across the ‘corporate veil’ and hence ‘foreseeability’, where causation remains linked to the 
adequacy of a due diligence plan, proving this will not be easy 11. Quantifying reparation or achieving 
restitution can also be difficult where corporate abuses have long-term effects, while designing collective 
remedies is challenging whether inside or outside a judicial process. Civil remedies should then be 
supplemented by non-financial reparations when restitution is not possible12, as well as operational, 
company- and/or sector-level grievance mechanisms (SER, n.d.), state-based non-judicial remedy 
mechanisms (e.g. NCPs and NHRIs) and, ideally, MS and EU bodies with powers to support and advise 
victims, for instance through investigations and legal representation.  
Such measures are not just desirable, but essential to ensuring effective remedy for victims of abuses both 
intra- and extra-EU. Yet addressing them in a single EU instrument establishing due diligence duties for 
companies would appear challenging in feasibility terms, given inter alia the subsidiarity principle and 
restricted EU competences. On this basis, it seems more likely that an EU due diligence law could support 
effective remedy for victims by requiring the establishment of effective grievance mechanisms as an 
element of due diligence and by requiring MS to provide not only for effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties for breaches but also effective means of remedy and redress for victims. Guidance 
could then address more specific issues surrounding civil and criminal liability of companies or responsible 
officers for harms caused by failures of human rights due diligence and other forms of remediation for 
victims.  
 
11 Vedanta: fn 10.  
12 Including rehabilitation, satisfaction, verification of facts and full and public disclosure of the truth, official declaration or a judicial 
decision restoring the dignity, reputation and rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim; public apology, 
including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; and guarantees of non-repetition. 
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5 Recommendations 
As noted in earlier sections, provisions on monitoring, enforcement and remedy in a future EU due 
diligence law will be influenced by the legislation’s scope in other areas, for instance, the class of 
companies to whom a due diligence duty is addressed. The latter is beyond the scope of this briefing. 
However, for the purpose of advancing recommendations, this briefing will assume that the due diligence 
duty applies at least to a fixed class of large companies, requires that the due diligence process address 
those companies’ own operations and supply chains, and also conform to nationally or internationally 
recognised due diligence frameworks, such as the OECD Guidelines on Due Diligence for Responsible 
Business Conduct (OECD, 2018).  
5.1 Monitoring  
Taking due account of considerations including size, an EU due diligence law should require that 
companies: 
1. Undertake periodic monitoring to address inter alia their business’ structure, activities, actual and 
potential human rights risks and impacts, complaints received, and effectiveness of remediation, as 
a required element of human rights due diligence and in line with the scope of due diligence duty 
prescribed by the legislation. 
2. Establish an alert/complaint mechanism open to workers and third parties. 
3. Adequately involve stakeholders, including workers, in the design and operation of monitoring 
arrangements under the due diligence process. 
4. Periodically disclose information on company monitoring and its outcomes; and publish this, in a 
standardised format, based on an adequate reporting framework, using appropriately prominent 
and accessible media (e.g. homepage). 
5. Secure board-level approval for monitoring schemes and reports. 
An EU due diligence law should require that MS: 
6. Provide for a right to know/information request procedure. 
7. Establish a repository of due diligence reports that is publicly accessible without charge. 
8. Publish lists of companies within the law’s scope and identify on a regular basis those that have 
complied with procedural obligations and those that have not. 
9. Establish/identify national monitoring bodies, ideally independent, with inter alia duties to report on 
procedural compliance but also substantive effectiveness at national level. 
Under an EU due diligence law, the EU should: 
10. Establish a repository of due diligence reports that is publicly accessible without charge. 
11. Publish lists of companies within the law’s scope and identify on a regular basis those that have 
complied with procedural obligations and those that have not. 
12. Undertake periodic monitoring of procedural compliance but also substantive effectiveness at EU 
level. 
13. Further elaborate on due diligence required under the law via delegated legislation and/or formal 
guidance.  
Further analysis is required before recommendations can be advanced in relation to: 
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• Certification or assurance by third-party organisations of company monitoring and accreditation of 
such organisations at EU level. 
• Specific arrangements for involvement of workers, human rights defenders and other stakeholders 
in monitoring under an EU due diligence law. 
Finally, while these matters exceed the current briefing, including financial actors and relevant regional 
financial institutions (e.g. EIB), as well as large public entities in the scope of due diligence requirements 
could contribute further to promoting effective due diligence monitoring. 
5.2 Enforcement 
An EU due diligence law should require that MS: 
1. Determine effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance by companies with 
due diligence obligations, including in relation to the making of false or misleading statements 
regarding due diligence. 
2. Establish rights to enforce at least procedural aspects of due diligence requirements for interested 
parties. 
3. Establish/identify national bodies with competence inter alia to enforce at least procedural aspects 
of due diligence requirements. 
4. Periodically report at EU level on national enforcement procedures, actions and outcomes. 
Under an EU due diligence law, the EU should: 
5. Publish guidance addressing effective enforcement action at MS level. 
Further analysis is required before recommendations can be advanced in relation to: 
• Leveraging EU public procurement law to promote compliance with due diligence obligations and 
securing policy coherence and a level playing field as between the public and private sector. 
• Steps required to align EU development, governance and diplomatic initiatives with new EU due 
diligence legislation, in line with ‘policy coherence’ as directed by the UNGPs. 
5.3 Remedy 
Taking due account of considerations including company size, an EU due diligence law should: 
1. Specify adequate remediation as a required element of human rights due diligence in line with the 
scope of due diligence duty prescribed by the legislation. 
2. Require companies to monitor and disclose information relating to due diligence and its outcomes 
and to establish, monitor and report on the operation of alert/complaint mechanisms, in line with 
recommendations made above in Section 5.1. 
An EU due diligence law should require that MS: 
3. Provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches (see above, point 5.2.) 
4. Provide for effective means of remedy and redress for victims, to include state level judicial and non-
judicial remedies, for human rights abuses caused by due diligence failures. 
5. Establish/identify bodies competent to investigate abuses, initiate enforcement actions and support 
victims, for instance through legal advice and representation.  
Under an EU due diligence law and/or other EU legislation and policy initiatives, the EU should: 
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6. Publish formal guidance on securing effective remedies for victims via civil and criminal liability of 
companies or responsible officers for harms caused by failures of human rights due diligence and in 
relation to broader mechanisms by which effective remediation can be secured for victims inside 
and beyond MS jurisdiction. 
7. Continue to cooperate with MS towards removing barriers to access to judicial and non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms as well as legal and other threats to human rights defenders, civil society 
organisations and other actors or participants in the justice system inter alia via SLAPP suits. 
Further analysis is required before recommendations can be advanced in relation to: 
• The feasibility of reviewing the Brussels I regime in the context of an EU due diligence law. 
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Annex I: Monitoring - evaluation of potential measures  
Mechanism Strengths  Weaknesses Impact  Feasibility∗   
Due diligence law/formal guidance mandates 
internal company monitoring scheme 
including complaint mechanism, board 
approval; periodic public reporting e.g. via 
website. 
Effective internal monitoring critical to identification of material risks, effective due 
diligence and remediation processes. Reliability of monitoring can be increased 
through stakeholder involvement in monitoring and specification of required 
elements. 
In isolation, internal monitoring may 
not identify material risks or provide a 
sufficient basis for accountability to 
stakeholders. Resource implications for 
small companies. 
High High 
MS/EU bodies to: establish repository of 
companies’ due diligence monitoring reports;  
promote and review legislation’s  
effectiveness, e.g. by checks, analysing 
reports. 
Enhances third party access to information on company due diligence reports.  
Promotes availability of information, homogenous implementation of monitoring  
duties, early recognition of risks and timely responses. 
Limited capacity of third parties to 
review and evaluate company reports;  
does not guarantee quality of reports.  
Costs and coordination issues. 
High Medium 
Law/guidance requires company to involve 
stakeholders in monitoring, including trade 
unions and workers’ representatives. 
Worker and rights-holder involvement in monitoring demonstrated to enhance 
effectiveness of due diligence and remediation. 
Detailed legislative provisions may not 
attract cross-jurisdictional support. 
Medium Medium 
Establishment of formal right to information / 
request procedure for parties affected by 
non/compliance with monitoring. 
Enhances accountability and effectiveness of due diligence legislation and process. Requires body competent to deal with  
complaints / where right to know is not 
complied with; running costs could be 
high. 
High Medium 
Due diligence law requires external 
audit/certification of companies’ due 
diligence process. 
 Independent third party assessment providing further information and 
understanding of supply chains and risks and identification of actual and potential 
harms.  
Concerns regarding impartiality and 
conflict of interest of social audits. 
Low High 
EU recognition of private bodies as recognised 
monitoring organisations. 
Independent third party assessment providing further information and 
understanding of supply chains and risks and identification of actual and potential 
harms following a homogeneous approach and guarantying quality and 
independence of monitor organisation. 
Cost and organisation of the network of  
monitoring organisations. 
Medium Medium 
 
 
∗ Feasibility refers to the likelihood of adoption of the measure or mechanisms given the legal, political and institutional context and costs and investment needed.  
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Annex II: Enforcement - evaluation of potential measures  
Measures and mechanism Strengths Weaknesses Impact  Feasibility 
Government enforcement of failure to 
comply with procedural DD requirements 
Relatively fast and low-cost process. Precedents in existing 
schemes. 
Does not address quality or impact of due diligence 
process. May not be effective where penalties are minimal. 
Medium High 
Government enforcement relating to quality 
of DD scheme/process 
Addresses quality and effectiveness of due diligence 
process. Precedents in existing schemes.  
Resource intensive. Potentially requires investigative 
powers with extraterritorial reach. 
High Medium 
Third party enforcement of failure to comply  
with procedural DD requirements  
Relatively fast and low-cost process. Precedents in existing 
schemes. 
Does not address quality or impact of due diligence 
process. Resources and potentially legal representation  
needed.  Assumes third-party resources and capacities to 
utilise. May not be effective or used where penalties are  
minimal. 
Low Medium 
Penalties for false/misleading information Precedents in existing schemes. Extends beyond procedural 
obligations to limited extent. 
May not be effective where penalties are minimal. Medium High 
Third party enforcement relating to quality of 
DD scheme/process 
Message of importance of the issue and relevance of the 
offence. Potential deterrence effect. My generated wider 
lessons learned.  
Resources and legal representation potentially needed.   
Resource-intensive for civil/judicial authorities;  
predictability/legal certainty issues. 
Medium Low 
MS bodies with enforcement mandates  Promote convergent practice at national /EU level.  
Independence would enhance perceived legitimacy by civil 
society, stakeholders and victims.  
Dependant on government support and resources. 
Potential conflicts of interest if not independent. Potential 
obstacles to access to information. 
Medium Medium 
Criminal sanctions relating to due diligence 
failures 
Potential deterrence effect and symbolic value. Duration of legal processes. Evidentiary requirements for 
complex offences. Limited EU legal competence. 
Medium Low 
Integration of due diligence requirements 
into EU-public procurements / state-support 
for investments / development aid / IFI 
lending conditions 
Policy coherence. Potential deterrence effect 
Governments lead by example / level playing field across 
public and private sectors. 
Requirements for other regulatory and/or policy reforms 
at EU/MS level. Capacity constraints in public buyers and 
possible higher procurement costs. 
Medium Medium 
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Annex III: Remedy - evaluation of potential measures  
Mechanism Strengths  Weakness Impact  Feasibility 
Require companies to establish or 
participate in internal grievance 
mechanisms as part of HRDD. 
Low cost for victims and MS. Potentially fast access to 
grievance process and remediation. May be preventive. 
Concerns regarding independence including potential 
lack of access to evidence by victims. Weak deterrence 
effect, especially if confidentiality clauses attached. 
Low High 
Require companies to monitor and disclose 
DD information. 
Can support procedural dimension of right to remedy by 
making information accessible; may contribute to 
prevention. 
Quality of DD information and relevance to specific 
cases. 
Low High 
Right of civil action for harm due to due 
diligence failures for victims/representativ e 
third parties. 
Guarantees access to judicial mechanisms.  Provides  
compensation to victims. Potential deterrence effect. 
Cost and resource intensive for MS and victims. Burden 
of proof on victims. Ex-post rather than preventive. 
Subsidiarity. 
High Medium 
Criminal procedures against companies,  
directors or personnel linked to serious  
abuses caused by failures of due diligence.  
Serious abuses may require criminal accountability against 
perpetrators. High deterrence effect. 
Limited EU competences; proceedings cost and resource 
intensive for MS and victims. Low number of cases to 
reach court and end in conviction. 
High Low 
National supervisory authorities can advise 
potential victims (e.g. NHRI, Ombudsperson 
or dedicated body). 
MS seen to support victims of harm. Resources invested in 
supporting access to remedy. 
Need to revise competences of existing bodies or create 
new bodies - resources and capacities. Access to 
corporate information and evidence of harm if no 
specific executive powers are provided. 
High Medium 
Require MS to prohibit companies from 
launching SLAPP suits against complainants 
under HRDD legislation and/or other 
judicial or non-judicial remedy mechanisms.  
Strong commitment to victim redress. Addresses the 
imbalance of power between corporations and victims and 
their representatives and civil society. 
Prescriptive approach to EU due diligence law decreases 
chance of enactment. 
Medium Medium 
Require MS to extend legal aid to 
complainants under HRDD legislation.  
Strong commitment to victim redress. Guarantees access to 
judicial procedures. 
Costs to MS. Competence; prescriptive approach to EU 
due diligence law decreases chance of enactment. 
High Low 
Require MS/EU to publish lists of companies  
subject to DD duty / complying with  
procedural aspects / defending /held liable 
under legal DD proceedings. 
Access to information and transparency. May support victims’  
further actions against a company. 
  
Competence; prescriptive approach to EU due diligence 
law decreases chance of enactment. Conformance with 
confidentiality and libel provisions (for defendants). 
High Medium 
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Annex IV: Human rights due diligence instruments – monitoring provisions 
EU legislation  
Monitoring approach EU NFR Directive EU Timber Regulation 2010 EU Conflict Minerals (2017) 
Company monitoring of 
implementation of DD duty 
Statement to include information on 
policies and due diligence processes 
of the entity and where 
proportionate its supply chains, to 
the extent necessary for 
understanding its development, 
performance and position and 
impact (on HR). 
Operators shall exercise due diligence when placing timber or timber 
products on the market. 
Each operator shall maintain and regularly evaluate the due diligence 
system which it uses, except where the operator makes use of a due 
diligence system established by a monitoring organisation. 
[Article 4] 
Implied by requirement that companies must conduct DD 
(develop management systems / identify and assess risks, 
implement a strategy for risk management, carry out third party 
audits and report annually on policies and practices for 
responsible sourcing) on their supply chain (Art 4(c)). 
Companies required to establish chain of custody or supply chain 
traceability system (Arts 4(f) and (g)). 
Company to publish HRDD report Statement to be provided in 
management report on non-
financial matters and made publicly 
available. 
 Companies required to report on due diligence on their supply 
chain. 
Rights-holder or third party 
involvement in monitoring 
/verification 
 The regulation creates the figure of ‘monitoring organisations’.  
A monitoring organisation shall:(a) maintain and regularly evaluate a due 
diligence system as set out in Article 6 and grant operators the right to use 
it; (b) verify the proper use of its due diligence system by such operators;  
(c) take appropriate action in the event of failure by an operator to properly 
use its due diligence system, including notification of competent 
authorities in the event of significant or repeated failure by the operator. 
An organisation may apply for recognition as a monitoring organisation if 
it complies with the following requirements: (a) it has legal personality and 
is legally established within the Union; (b) it has appropriate expertise and 
the capacity to exercise the functions referred to in paragraph 1; and (c) it 
ensures the absence of any conflict of interest in carrying out its functions. 
 
Companies required to undertake independent third party audits 
of their due diligence practices (unless show source only from 
approved sources). 
Competent authorities may undertake ex-post checks on 
importers’ effective compliance based on ‘substantiated 
concerns by third parties’ (Art 11(2)). 
Regulation provides for recognition as equivalent of due 
diligence schemes (Art 8(1): ‘1. Governments, industry 
associations and groupings of interested organisations having 
due diligence schemes in place (‘scheme owners’) may apply to 
the Commission to have the supply chain  due  diligence schemes  
that  are developed and  overseen by  them  recognised by  the  
Commission. Such applications shall be supported by adequate 
evidence and information’.); EC to adopt delegated acts on 
methodology and criteria for assessing if schemes facilitate  
fulfilment of the requirements of the Reg (Art 8(2)). 
National monitoring  Member States shall ensure that 
undertakings publish within a 
reasonable period of time, which 
shall not exceed 12 months after the 
balance sheet date, the duly 
approved annual financial 
Each Member State shall designate one or more Competent Authorities  
(CA) responsible for the application of this Regulation. 
Competent Authorities (CA) are    tasked    with performing checks on 
operators, traders and monitoring organisations to ensure that they fulfil 
their obligations under the regulation (they should monitor that operators  
effectively fulfil the obligations laid down in this Regulation. For that 
EU MS required to adopt measures to identify national mineral 
and metal importers and to access data on their economic 
activities and DD checks and reporting. Regulation requires 
Member States’ competent bodies to ensure that a list of all 
Union importers within their country is publicly available (cf. 
objections by Member States’ Customs Agencies). 
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EU legislation  
Monitoring approach EU NFR Directive EU Timber Regulation 2010 EU Conflict Minerals (2017) 
statements and the management 
report, together with the opinion 
submitted by the statutory auditor 
or audit firm. 
purpose, the competent authorities should carry out official checks, in 
accordance with a plan as appropriate, which may include checks on the 
premises of operators and field audits, and should be able to require  
operators to take remedial actions where necessary). 
Member States shall inform the Commission of the names and addresses 
of the CA by 3 June 2011. Member States shall inform the Commission of 
any changes to the names or addresses of the competent authorities. 
 
Competent authorities must undertake appropriate ex-post 
checks, including on the spot inspections, to ‘ensure that Union 
importers of minerals or metals comply’ . 
Such checks to examine at minimum importers’ implementation 
of obligations; documents and records; audit obligations.  
Checks can be initiated based on substantiated concerns by 
third parties. 
Supranational monitoring 
(procedural) 
 Member States shall submit to the Commission, by 30 April of every second 
year following 3 March 2013, a report on the application of this Regulation 
during the previous two years. 
MS required to inform EC of name/address of competent 
authority; to obtain information on annual import volumes per 
importer; identify all importers in their jurisdiction. 
Regulation/delegated Regulation 13 establishes methodology  
and criteria that EC will use to assess whether DD schemes 
(industry-led responsible sourcing initiatives) can be recognised 
as facilitating company’s compliance with the Regulation 
(currently based on policies and standards of schemes). 
MS have to submit annual reports on the implementation of the 
regulation, and, in particular, on notices of remedial action issued 
by their competent authorities and on the third-party audit 
reports made available by union importers. 
Supranational monitoring 
(effectiveness) 
 On the basis of reports (above) the Commission shall draw up a report to 
be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council every two 
years. In preparing the report, the Commission shall have regard to the 
progress made in respect of the conclusion and operation of the FLEGT 
VPAs pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 and their contribution to 
minimising the presence of illegally harvested timber and timber products 
derived from such timber on the internal market. 
 
In 2023 and triannually thereafter, EU shall determine based on 
Member States’ reports, the effectiveness of the regulation and 
assess whether Member States should have competence to 
impose penalties on entities ‘in the event of persistent failure to 
comply’ (Article 17(3)). 
EU may also review legislation before 2023. 
EC to publish handbook for competent authorities (Art 11) and 
handbook for economic operators (Art 14). 
  
 
13 Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/429. 
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National legislation / initiatives  
Monitoring approach LDV France Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act Norway proposed law 14 
Company monitoring  Art 1 / Art L.225-102-4 Vigilance includes: i) 
establishing procedures regularly to assess 
subsidiaries and subcontractors and suppliers with 
established commercial relationship; ii) 
monitoring scheme to assess efficiency of 
measures implemented; iii) alert / whistleblowing  
mechanism to collect reports. 
Requirement that companies declare that they exercise due diligence 
per Art 5 to prevent goods or services from being produced using child 
labour (Art 4(1)). 
Due diligence includes investigation of whether there is reasonable 
suspicion of use of child labour, and in that case adoption and 
implementation of an action plan  
An Order in Council will establish further requirements for the 
investigation and the plan of action. 
However, not an annual but a one-off requirement. 
Enterprises producing goods for consumers must publish 
information on the production site (s6) [so must monitor 
production sites]. 
 
All enterprises obliged to know salient risks that may impact 
adversely on human rights and decent work in own business 
and supply chains (s5). 
 
Larger enterprises shall report on structure, area of 
operations, supply chains (including management systems 
and early warning channels) for preventing/ reducing 
adverse impacts; on due diligence and adverse 
impacts/salient risks of such impacts and results of due 
diligence (s10(2)). 
 
Company publish HRDD 
report 
Companies must disclose DD processes, including 
Vigilance Plan and report (can be integrated into 
e.g. annual financial report; not required to be a 
stand-alone document). 
Companies must register declarations in trade register and send them 
to the superintendent (Art 4(2)) – but on one-off rather than annual 
basis. 
Production sites to be published on enterprise’s website or 
otherwise made easily accessible (s6(2)). 
 
Larger enterprises’ report may be included in annual report 
on social responsibility or publicly disclosed in another 
manner. 
 
Rights-holder or third party 
involvement in monitoring 
/verification 
Company’s representative trade unions to be 
consulted on design/implementation of alert 
mechanism / ‘to be developed in working 
partnership’. 
The vigilance plan shall be drafted in association  
with the company’s stakeholders and where 
appropriate within multiparty initiatives that exist 
in the subsidiaries or at a territorial level (Art 1); 
however, this is not a mandatory requirement. 
Any natural person or legal entity whose interests are affected by the 
actions or omissions of a company relating to compliance [under this 
Act] may submit a complaint to the superintendent (Art 3(2)) on basis of 
a concrete indication of non-compliance (Art 3(3)) only after the 
complainant has attempted to work with the company directly or if 
having attempted to do so the company has not addressed the issue in 
six months  (Art 3(4)). 
Minister may approve joint multi-stakeholder plans of action. 
 
 
 
Draft law establishes ‘right to information’ on ‘how an 
enterprise conducts itself with regard to fundamental human 
rights and decent work within the enterprise and its supply 
chains’ (s7). 
 
Also establishes an information request procedure extending 
to how enterprise manages any adverse impact or risk (s7). 
 
14 Norway Ethics Information Committee (2019), Report from the Ethics Information Committee, 28 November 2019, available at: 
https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/etikkinformasjonsutvalget/norwegian-ethics-information-committee/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 
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National legislation / initiatives  
Monitoring approach LDV France Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act Norway proposed law 14 
National monitoring 
(procedural) 
 Superintendent shall publish all declarations in a public register on its  
website (Art 4(5)). 
The Consumer Authority and the Market Council conduct 
monitoring to ensure compliance with the provisions of this 
Act (s13). 
National monitoring 
(substantive) 
 Superintendent is charged with supervision of compliance with the 
provisions of the Act (Art 3(2)). 
Within five years of entry into force of Act, Minister to send a report on 
effectiveness and practical effects of the Act (Art 10). 
The Consumer Authority and the Market Council conduct 
monitoring to ensure compliance with the provisions of this 
Act (s13). 
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Disclosure-based regimes 
Monitoring approach Dodd Frank Act Final Rule 1502 
(2012) 
CTSCA 2012 UK MSA 2015 Aus MSA 2018 NSW MSA 2018 
Company monitoring  (If company determines itself high 
risk on basis of country of origin  
inquiries) company must do due 
diligence on the source and chain of 
custody that conforms to nationally  
or internationally recognised DD 
framework in good faith and 
reasonably designed. 
Ongoing monitoring not implied as 
disclosure is one-time. 
Companies to report annually on 1) 
nature and structure of the business; 
2) human rights supply chain risks 
associated to the business; 3) The 
implemented due diligence 
procedures; 4) Effectiveness of due 
diligence procedures; 5) Training 
made available to staff (S54 MSA). 
Annual MSA statements must detail 
against mandatory criteria i)  
identity, structure, operations and 
supply chains; ii) MS risks identified;  
iii) actions taken to assess and 
address risks including DD and 
remediation; iv) effectiveness of the 
actions v) consultation process with  
other entities owned or controlled. 
Statements must be approved by 
Board or equivalent. 
Described in regulations / formal 
guidance. 
May include management steps and 
training for employees. 
Company publish HRDD 
report 
Company must include description  
of measures taken to exercise due 
diligence on conflict minerals’  
source and chain of custody in an 
annual special disclosure report to 
SEC. 
If low risk, then company only  
required to disclose determination  
and description of enquiry and 
results on ‘reasonable country of  
origin’ inquiries and to make 
information available on website. 
If high risk, company must do due 
diligence on the source and chain of 
custody that conforms to nationally  
or internationally recognised due 
diligence framework´; depending 
on outcome, company may be 
required to submit a ‘Conflict 
Minerals Report’ in addition,  
identifying non-conflict free 
products, facilities used to process  
Company must disclose to what 
extent if any it 1) verifies its product 
supply chains to evaluate and 
address risks of human trafficking or 
slavery; 2) audits its suppliers to 
evaluate compliance with company 
standards; 3) requires certification s  
from direct suppliers confirming  
materials comply with local laws; 4) 
maintains internal accountability for 
employees and contractors; 5) trains 
employees and management with  
direct responsibility for supply chain 
management on HTS. 
Disclosure via conspicuous and 
easily understood website or by 
timely email response. 
Reporting entities required to 
produce annual Slavery and Human 
Trafficking Statement and publish 
on their own homepage; report to 
be signed by a Director and 
approved by Board. 
Reporting entities must file annual 
MSA statement within six months of  
end of reporting period. 
Reporting entities must file annual 
MSA statement; method of  
reporting and prescribed reporting  
content to be defined in statutory  
regulations. 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 
 
30 
Disclosure-based regimes 
Monitoring approach Dodd Frank Act Final Rule 1502 
(2012) 
CTSCA 2012 UK MSA 2015 Aus MSA 2018 NSW MSA 2018 
them, country of origin of minerals  
and efforts to determine origin 15. 
Rights-holder or third 
party involvement in 
monitoring /verification 
For high risk: Independent private 
sector audit (i.e. certification) of  
Conflict Minerals Report and 
identify auditor. 
Implication that supplier audits are 
performed by independent entities. 
Act’s requirements not extended to 
subcontractors. 
   
National monitoring of  
individual compliance 
(procedural) 
 Office of the Attorney-General is  
responsible for determining 
whether companies (on list 
composed by Tax Board) are in 
compliance with Act’s  
requirements. 
 MSA statements published on free 
government-run online public 
register – but no central list 
published of companies required to 
report. 
Free public electronic register listing  
companies disclosing risks of  
linkage to modern slavery. 
Anti-Slavery Commissioner has 
mandate to monitor reporting  
concerning risks of modern slavery 
occurring in supply chains of 
government agencies and 
commercial organisations. 
National monitoring  
(Substantive) 
Third party annual review 
(Responsible Sourcing Network’s  
Mining the Disclosures — yearly 
evaluation of companies’ activities  
to address conflict minerals,  
including risk management, human 
rights impact, and reporting  
quality). 
 Civil society and academic review of  
reports (Repository held at the NGO 
Business, Human Rights Resource 
Centre). 
Home Affairs Minister required to 
prepare annual report on 
compliance and non-compliance 
and table before Parliament 
Operation of Act reviewed after 
three years. 
No MSA Commissioner. 
Anti-Slavery Commissioner required 
to monitor effectiveness of due 
diligence procedures to ensure that 
goods and services procured by 
government agencies are not 
produced with modern slavery. 
 
15 National Association of Manufacturers, et al. v SEC 800 F.3d 518, final judgement No.13-CF-000635 (D.D.C. 3 April 2017) struck down requirement for chain of custody report (specifically requirement 
that business identify minerals in supply chain with the phrase ‘have not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’ under s1.01(a) of final rules as violation of First Amdt to Constitution.) 
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Annex V: Human rights due diligence instruments – enforcement provisions 
EU regulation 
Enforcement approach EU NFR EU Timber EU Conflict minerals 
Competent authority for 
enforcement 
Each EU MS to determine 
the consequences of non-
compliance in national 
legislation. 
 
The penalties provided 
for shall be effective,  
proportionate and 
dissuasive. 
Each MS shall designate one or more Competent Authorities (CA) 
responsible for the application of this Regulation. 
MS shall notify the provisions on penalties established to the 
Commission and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent 
amendments affecting them. 
 The implementation is based on a system of recognised due diligence schemes (art. 8): 
governments, industry  associations and  groupings of  interested organisations having due  
diligence schemes in place  (‘scheme  owners’)  may  apply to  the  EC to  have  the  supply 
chain  due  diligence schemes  that  are developed and  overseen by  them  recognised by  the  
Commission. Where the EC identifies a failure to comply with the Regulation or deficiencies in 
a recognised supply chain due diligence scheme, it may grant the scheme owner an 
appropriate period of time to take remedial action. Where the scheme owner fails or refuses 
to take the necessary remedial action, the EC may withdraw the recognition of the scheme 
(art. 8 and 15.2). 
Administrative 
/procedural  
 MS shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to 
infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take 
all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. 
The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and may include, inter alia: (a) fines proportionate to 
the environmental damage, the value of the timber or timber 
products concerned and the tax losses and economic detriment 
resulting from the infringement, calculating the level of such fines 
in such way as to make sure that they effectively deprive those 
responsible of the economic benefits derived from their serious  
infringements, without prejudice to the legitimate right to 
exercise a profession, and gradually increasing the level of such 
fines for repeated serious infringements; (b) seizure of the timber 
and timber products concerned; (c) immediate suspension of  
authorisation to trade. 
MS may issue a notice of remedial action to be taken by Union importer. 
The regulation foresees its review in 2023, when the Commission will assess whether MS 
should have competence to impose penalties upon importers in the event of persistent failure 
to comply. 
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National due diligence laws / initiatives 
Enforcement approach LDV France 2017 Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act) (2019) Norway proposal 
Administrative 
/procedural  
Formal notice to comply (mise en demeure), if company  
fails to establish, implement or publish a vigilance plan; 
company has three months to comply, whereafter judge 
can order publication of a plan; judge can also rule on 
whether VP is complete and appropriately fulfils  
obligations described in the law. 
 
Periodic penalty payments (daily or event basis pending 
fulfilment of defendant’s obligation) [astreintes]. 
 
Any person with standing/concerned parties (includes 
NGOs, victims and unions) can seek formal notice and 
injunction to comply. 
Superintendent may issue binding instruction with time limit. 
If binding instruction not complied with superintendent may 
impose an administrative fine for: 
• violation of Art 4(2) (sending statement to 
Superintendent/trade register) to level set by Dutch 
Criminal Code, 
• failure to comply with duty to conduct investigations or 
define an action plan under Arts 5(1) or 5(3), 
Any natural person or legal entity whose interests are affected 
by the actions or omissions of a company relating to 
compliance [under this Act] may submit a complaint to the 
superintendent (Art 3(2)) on basis of a concrete indication of 
non-compliance (Art 3(3)) only after dealt with by company or 
if the latter has not responded within six months after 
submission (Art 3(4)). 
The Consumer Authority and the Market Council conduct 
monitoring to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Act 
(s13). 
Enforcement penalties may only be determined for 
contravention of disclosure requirements relating to: 
- transparency about production sites, 
- right to information requests, 
- (for larger enterprises) annual due diligence reporting. 
 
Any person can request information of any enterprise on its 
work, system, steps taken to prevent or reduce adverse impact 
on HR and working conditions and how enterprise manages 
specific risks or impacts: (s7). 
Civil  Art 2/Art L.225-102-5 Ordinary civil action for tortiou s  
damage under Arts 1240/1241 French Civil Code (victim 
bears burden of proof) caused by default of obligations 
under Art 2 by parent, subsidiaries or suppliers/ 
subcontractors with established commercial relationship  
(i.e. lack of reasonable vigilance); notices to comply and 
alerts may be probative of lack of vigilance. 
Victims include stakeholders (associations, NGOs as well 
as individuals, communities, unions whose rights and 
obligations are affected. 
California Attorney-General has exclusive authority to lead civil 
action for injunctive relief to take specific action (S3(d). 
 
Criminal Draft law provided for fine for non-compliance; found 
unconstitutional on grounds of legal certainty/Art 8 
Declaration Rights of Man. 
Criminal offence established under Economic Offences Act for 
repeat offending on grounds that same violation committed by 
order of or under the de facto leadership of the same manager 
within five years of the preceding violation (Art 9). 
Infringement penalty may be established for repeated wilful or 
negligent infringement of sections 6, 7 and 10, to be paid by 
infringing person or entity (s13). 
Ministry may be regulation lay down more detailed rules 
governing imposition of enforcement penalties and 
assessment of infringement penalties (s 13(4)). 
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Disclosure-based regimes 
Enforcement approach Dodd Frank Act Final Rule 1502 
(2012) 
California TSCA 2012 UK MSA 2015 Aus Fed MSA (2018) NSW MSA (2018) 
Administrative 
/procedural  
Reporting company is liable for 
misleading and false statements 
unless it can be shown that it acted 
in good faith and did not know the 
report is misleading or false 
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
s13(p) 15 USC 78m. 
(SEC Division of Corporation  
Finance held that it would not 
recommend enforcement against 
companies that only file reports on 
country of origin inquires and on 
whether conflict minerals 
may/originate from relevant 
country.) 
No fines; Attorney General may file 
civil action for injunctive relief.  
Secretary of State may seek 
injunction from High Court 
requiring production of annual 
slavery and human trafficking 
statement. 
Failure to comply with injunction is 
contempt of court punishable by 
unlimited fine. 
No penalty for failing to report. Anti-Slavery Commissioner in the 
course of exercising her functions 
(which include monitoring company 
disclosure) may refer any information 
to law enforcement and government 
agencies. 
Failure to prepare and publish 
annual MSA statement or giving false 
or misleading information leads to 
fines (the law does not specify the 
procedure). 
Financial penalties up to AUD 
1.1million. 
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